

TRAINING ON ADMINISTRATION AND LEADERSHIP FOR YOUTH IN MASSAWA



The National Union of Eritrean Youth and Students branch in the Northern Red Sea Region provided training on administration and leadership to its members from the sub-zones of Nakfa, Qarora, Afabet, Sheib, Massawa, Foro, and Gelalo.

The training covered

administration and leadership, peer pressure, the importance of organization, and concepts of ideology and politics, among other topics.

At the conclusion of the training on 7 February, Mr. Salah Ahmed, Head of Organizational Affairs of the union branch in the

region, said that the objective of the training was to enhance the leadership qualities of youth and enable participants to share their experiences.

Noting that the training was part of the union branch's program to enhance the capacity of its members, Mr. Suleiman Yosuf, Head of Political Affairs of the union branch, called on the trainees to apply the knowledge gained from the training in their daily activities.

Highlighting the significance of the training, Mr. Irdi Ali, Head of Political Affairs for the PFDJ in the Northern Red Sea Region, called on the trainees to serve as role models for their peers.

SEMINAR ON ERADICATION OF HARMFUL PRACTICES

A seminar aimed at eradicating harmful practices in general, and underage marriage and female genital mutilation in particular, was conducted in administrative

not yet been totally eradicated in the areas, called for strengthened participation to prevent the suffering of



areas of the eastern escarpment of the Senafe sub-zone on 4 and 5 February.

At the seminar, Ms. Emuna Salah, Head of Foreign Relations at the National Union of Eritrean Women, gave an extensive briefing on the health and psychological consequences of underage marriage and female genital mutilation. She also called for reinforced public participation in efforts to eradicate these practices.

Ms. Emuna, noting that the prevalence of underage marriage and female genital mutilation has

women caused by such harmful practices.

Ms. Senait Afwerki, Head of the National Union of Eritrean Women in the Southern Region, noted that commendable efforts have been made to enhance women's role in the economic, cultural, social, and political sectors, but emphasized that stronger efforts are still needed to eradicate harmful practices.

The participants, on their part, expressed readiness to play their due role in the effort and called on the concerned institutions to conduct relentless public awareness-raising activities.

PRESS RELEASE FALSE ACCUSATIONS TO SERVE ULTERIOR AGENDAS

The patently false and fabricated accusations against Eritrea issued by Ethiopia's Foreign Minister yesterday is astounding in its tone and substance, underlying motivation, and overarching objective.

Sadly, it constitutes yet another deplorable act in a pattern and spiral of hostile campaigns against Eritrea for more than two years now.

As underlined before, the Government of Eritrea has no appetite for, or desire to, engage in meaningless acrimony to add fuel and exacerbate the situation.

Ministry of Information
Asmara
9 February 2026

NEW ELEMENTARY SCHOOL UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN ADER'ADA ADMINISTRATIVE AREA

A new elementary school is under construction in Ader'ada administrative area of Gala-Nefhi sub-zone in the Central Region. The school includes seven rooms and is expected to accommodate school-aged children who were unable to attend regular education because of the long distance to existing schools.

Mr. Tesfamariam Tewolde, the construction coordinator, said the school includes five classrooms, two offices, a water reservoir with a capacity of 100 barrels, toilets, and a compound. He also commended the support provided by the Adi-Halo Project toward the construction effort.

Mr. Bokru Gebredingil, administrator of the administrative area, said the initiative to construct a new elementary school was aimed

at enabling school-aged children in the area to access education locally. He further commended all those who participated and contributed to the construction of the school.

Mr. Daniel Solomon, head of the Education Office in the Gala-Nefhi sub-zone, and Ms. Freweini Haile, the school's director, said the previous school was located three kilometers from the administrative area, which negatively affected the teaching and learning process. They noted that with the construction of the new school, many school-aged children in the area will be able to attend classes regularly.

Ader'ada administrative area is located 23 kilometers south of Asmara and has a population of about 900 residents.

EFFORT TO ENHANCE THE CAPACITY OF YOUTH IN THE SOUTHERN REGION

The National Union of Eritrean Youth and Students branch in the Southern Region indicated that strong efforts are being exerted to enhance organizational capacity and youth development through the design of various programs.

At the conclusion of the training on administration and leadership, Mr. Girmay Gebru, Head of the union branch in the region, said that enhancing the overall capacity of

youth is a timely task of the union.

Mr. Girmay stated that training on administration and leadership was provided to 1,247 students, including 629 female students, from 33 secondary schools in the region from 24 January to 5 February. The training covered concepts of administration and leadership, the uniqueness of Eritrean history, and communication skills, among other topics.

Speaking at the occasion, Mr.

Wolday Gebre, Chairman of the Regional Assembly, urged the students to develop a reading culture, focus on innovation and creativity, and avoid harmful practices and addictions.

Ms. Amete Neguse, Secretary of the PFDJ in the region, called on the students to take advantage of the educational opportunities provided and play their due part in development programs.



Development

Bringing Vital Services to Remote Areas: Adobha Subzone



Guided by the tenets of social justice and equitable development, the Government has been steadfast in its commitment to improving the living standards of rural populations. Recognizing that national prosperity is meaningful only if it reaches the farthest corners of the country, it has channeled substantial investment toward rural areas. This approach ensures that the benefits of growth do not remain concentrated in urban centers but instead trickle down to the majority of the population. A prime example of the benefits of this ongoing effort is the development activities in Adobha subzone.

Historically, Adobha was known for its harsh and inhospitable environment. Local inhabitants remember the area as difficult to pass through, let alone settle in, due to its hot

climate, sparse rainfall, and deep, inaccessible groundwater. Its very name, which originated from the word 'Ado-ha,' is a testament to these conditions. 'Ado-ha,' a Tigre word, means "enemy of the cattle." In years past, as herders migrated from the south-western Barka region toward the east in search of water, many of their cattle are said to have perished in this arid land, giving the area its formidable reputation.

However, during the armed

Adobha subzone occurred during the administrative restructuring of 1996. Previously, the various localities within Adobha were administered separately under different subzones, which meant residents had to travel long distances to get services. In 1996, Adobha was established as a subzone with Eitaro (also known as Drit) as its administrative center.

Mr. Mohammed Omer Drar, Administrator of the subzone, said that as there was no social service in the past, it all had to start from scratch. Since then, the subzone has grown, and its population is increasing.

Adobha subzone is one of the places where village regrouping is promoted due to the scattered nature of the population's settlements. Village regrouping aims to create larger settlements by bringing together several scattered villages to make it easier

an EPLF base. Fighters fetched water from the wells dug around Etaro, Himbol, and Ela-babu, which are still serving the local population. Agriculture was also developed around Badin, but it ceased to function after the armed struggle ended. When the people of the subzone regrouped, they benefited from social services, such as education, healthcare, and clean drinking water that were made available near their homes.

One of the sectors that has made major progress in Adobha subzone is healthcare. There is one health center in Drit and one health station in Ela-Babu. In the remaining localities, healthcare services are provided by foot medics. Healthcare professionals are providing commendable service by raising community awareness and promoting disease prevention. Though there is one ambulance at the health center in Drit, it is insufficient to serve all the communities within the administrative areas because they live far from one another, Mr. Mohammed Omer said.

The education sector has undergone a radical transformation since 1991. While the EPLF conducted literacy campaigns during the armed struggle, there were no formal schools in the area before independence. Since then, however, six schools, from pre-school to junior secondary levels, have been established.

According to the Ministry of Education's bureau in the subzone, the schools are delivering promising results in expanding access to learning. To further encourage enrollment, the bureau provides stationery and free meals to students. Efforts are being intensified to reach students who did not have the opportunity to attend school at a younger age.



Mr. Mohammed Omer Drar

Adult education programs are also playing a critical role in combatting illiteracy. The high enrollment of women is particularly encouraging, and some of these adult learners are currently preparing for the eighth-grade general examination. Education officers remain focused on increasing enrollment rates for the upcoming academic year to ensure all children in the subzone are in the classroom.

Mr. Mohammed Omer said that considering that Adobha and its surrounding areas served as the rear base of the EPLF throughout the armed struggle for independence, the Ministry of Tourism's regional bureau should give due attention to the preservation of historic sites in the area because of their significant value and contribution to domestic tourism. The biggest challenge in the subzone is that of communication and transport. Mr. Mohammed said that the roads need renovation and expressed his hope that this will be done in the next few years.

Adobha subzone is one of the ten subzones of the Northern Red Sea region. Although by landmass it is the largest subzone in the region, it remains the most remote and least populated. Approximately 14,000 people live in the six local administrative areas within the subzone: Adobha Nues, Mdgag, Hasta, Ela-babu, Ararb, and Hager. It is known for its mountainous landscape around the plateaus of Rora-Habab, Nakfa, and Ayget, and its dry plains along the border with Sudan. Eitaro (which is also called Drit) is 75 Km to the north west of Nakfa. The remotest parts of the subzone are Ararb and Hager, 112 km west of the administration's center. The subzone is home to the Bidawyeet and Tigre ethnic groups. Although the predominant means of earning a living in Adobha subzone is pastoralism, subsistence farming and commercial agriculture are also practised.



struggle for independence, the formidable landscape of Adobha became a strategic lifeline, serving as a vital hub for the EPLF. It was home to the EPLF's administrative offices and gathering places, most notably the site of the historic Adobha Conference.

Furthermore, Adobha served as the EPLF's logistics and production backbone, housing storage facilities, garages, workshops, and essential supply routes. Service-rendering departments, such as the Revolution School and technical schools, operated alongside various supportive branches. This legacy of resilience remains visible today, as current residents still utilize the wells dug by freedom fighters at Eitaro, Himbol, and Ela-Babu.

A major turning point for

for the government to provide facilities and services.

For people to lead a sedentary life, access to potable water is critical. To address the potable water supply problem in the subzone, water is supplied using generators, solar panels, and manually operated pumps. This has been a motivating factor for the regrouping of villages. During the armed struggle for independence, the area around Adobha served as



**ERITREA
PROFILE**

**Published Every
Wednesday & Saturday**

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SpotLight

A major Signpost on The Road to Independence: Operation Fenqil

Bana Negusse

The Battle of Massawa in February 1990 was a decisive turning point in Eritrea's long struggle for independence from Ethiopia. More than a military victory, it symbolized the culmination of decades of resistance by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and marked the moment when Eritrean independence shifted from aspiration to inevitability. Massawa, a strategic Red Sea port and the Ethiopian occupying regime's gateway to naval supply lines, was crucial for the Dergue under Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam. Its capture not only cut off Ethiopian access to Soviet aid but also delivered a psychological blow from which the Ethiopian army could not recover.


The EPLF's path to Massawa was paved by years of disciplined preparation, careful strategy, and earlier victories that had weakened the Ethiopian military. Operations such as the Battle of Afabet in 1988 had severely demoralized Ethiopian forces and destroyed key divisions, giving the EPLF control over northern Eritrea and the initiative in the wider conflict. However, Massawa posed a different challenge: unlike inland engagements, it required a coordinated land-and-sea offensive against a well-defended urban and coastal stronghold. The port's strategic importance was immense – it was the occupying regime's principal Red Sea outlet and a crucial point for fuel, logistics, and Soviet-supplied weaponry. Capturing it would isolate Ethiopia from its most vital supply lines, effectively crippling its war effort in Eritrea.

In the months leading up to Operation Fenkil, the EPLF carefully prepared for a multi-front assault. Secretly, it expanded its naval capabilities, deploying gunboats, transport vessels, and captured Ethiopian equipment. Simultaneously, forces were positioned inland to cut off reinforcement routes to Massawa and Assab. The operation relied on speed, coordination, and the element of surprise – hallmarks of EPLF strategy honed over years of guerrilla warfare. On February 8, 1990, the assault began at dawn with attacks along three axes: inland, along the coastline, and directly on the port itself. Within two days, the EPLF had secured the mainland approaches, isolating

Ethiopian garrisons and preparing for the amphibious phase of the operation.

By February 16, EPLF forces had successfully stormed the islands guarding the port, completing the coordinated land-sea assault. The operation's effectiveness stemmed from meticulous planning, intimate knowledge of the terrain, and the disciplined coordination of land and naval forces. Ethiopian defenders, despite having access to heavy artillery, tanks, and Soviet advisors, were unable to mount a coherent defence. The rapid collapse of their positions reflected both the skill of EPLF fighters and the declining morale of Ethiopian troops, many of whom had already been weakened by prior defeats and overstretched supply lines.

The human and material cost for the Ethiopian army was staggering. Approximately 9,000–10,000 soldiers were killed, thousands more wounded, and scores of high-ranking officers, including



generals, were captured. Many others retreated toward Ghinda, leaving behind stocks of weapons and heavy equipment that the EPLF repurposed to strengthen its own operations. The loss of Massawa also severed Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea, cutting off a crucial artery for fuel, ammunition, and logistical support. As one captured general remarked:

"The war is almost over now. The army's morale is low, and they don't want to fight. The central government can't handle it anymore unless they start negotiating. They have no other alternative. I don't think they can even last another two or three months."

The victory at Massawa was not only strategic but symbolic. The port had long been a linchpin of

Ethiopian control in Eritrea, and its capture marked the effective collapse of Ethiopian authority along the coast. It also demonstrated the EPLF's ability to execute complex, high-stakes operations that combined guerrilla tactics with conventional amphibious

resources to decisively shift the balance of power. In this way, the battle represented not only a local victory but also a broader commentary on the limitations of externally imposed military power in conflicts driven by local determination and knowledge.

Afabet, which had demonstrated the EPLF's growing military capabilities, Massawa showcased the organization's capacity for complex joint operations, integrating land and naval forces to achieve decisive results. It also marked a turning point in



manoeuvres – an evolution from the insurgency strategies that had defined the 1970s and 1980s. By seizing Massawa, the EPLF secured a critical logistical hub for future operations, enabling the eventual capture of Assab and, ultimately, Asmara.

The battle's significance extended beyond the immediate military outcome. By cutting off Ethiopia from the Red Sea, the EPLF effectively undermined the Dergue regime's capacity to wage war in Eritrea, while boosting the morale of Eritrean fighters and civilians alike. International observers took note: the defeat signalled that Eritrean independence, long considered improbable, was now within reach. The capture of Massawa also reflected a broader pattern in which local knowledge, strategic planning, and disciplined execution allowed the EPLF to overcome a technically superior adversary supported by a global superpower.

Massawa's fall also highlighted the changing geopolitical context of the late Cold War era. The Ethiopian government, heavily reliant on Soviet military support, found that conventional aid alone could not compensate for poor morale, logistical failures, and strategic miscalculations. EPLF forces, by contrast, leveraged a combination of local support, tactical flexibility, and innovative use of captured

Following Massawa, only Assab and Asmara remained under Ethiopian control. However, the EPLF's momentum was irreversible. Within months, remaining Ethiopian forces were increasingly isolated, demoralized, and unable to mount effective resistance. The capture of Massawa had broken the backbone of Ethiopia's operations, leaving the Dergue regime unable to project power along Eritrea's coast or maintain its hold on the country's interior. The inevitability of Eritrea's independence gained traction, setting the stage for the eventual withdrawal of Ethiopian forces and the declaration of Eritrean sovereignty.

The Battle of Massawa stands as a testament to strategic vision, resilience, and the ability of a well-organized liberation movement to overcome superior numbers and advanced weaponry. Unlike

the psychological war, signalling to Ethiopian forces and the international community alike that Eritrean independence was no longer a distant dream but an impending reality.

In retrospect, the fall of Massawa exemplifies the confluence of strategy, morale, and historical necessity in shaping the outcome of protracted liberation struggles. By severing Ethiopia's lifeline to the sea, the EPLF not only reclaimed a critical port but also delivered a symbolic and practical blow from which the Dergue regime never recovered. The battle reaffirmed that disciplined organization, local knowledge, and strategic innovation could decisively overcome a conventionally superior force. Eritrea's eventual independence was the culmination of these victories – a hard-won triumph born of decades of struggle, tactical brilliance, and unyielding determination.



...Alena Douhan on the Negative Impacts of Unilateral Coercive Measures

Continued from page 8

When it comes to the right to food, we need to recognize that it is substantially affected, as many countries depend on food imports. But even if countries are relatively sustainable from an agricultural perspective, it's important to recognize that food is about more than sustainability. We are talking about food sustainability as a part of the Sustainable Development Goals, and to be sustainable, it's necessary to have fertilizers, seeds, agricultural machines, vaccines for livestock, energy, and more to have the ability to produce and preserve food for consumers.

Sometimes, countries that impose unilateral coercive measures refer to humanitarian exceptions that allow the delivery of food and medicine. It helps a bit, but in practice, the use of this humanitarian exception is usually non-effective and non-efficient because it refers to food and medicine only. Even for food and medicine, multiple licenses are necessary, as deliveries often aren't possible due to challenges with payment, delivery, and supply. However, access to health and food services extends beyond food and medicine. It's necessary to provide software, ensure adequate energy and clean water, train professionals, and pay appropriate salaries in the public sector, whether in agriculture or health.

During my time as a mandate holder, I also produced reports on the impacts of unilateral coercive measures on economic rights, housing rights, education and academic freedoms, and various categories of vulnerable groups. That's why, unfortunately, I can conclude that, in reality, nearly every human right may be affected by unilateral coercive measures, depending on the measures imposed and the country's ability to mitigate them.

The architecture of UCM is often described as a web rather than a single wall. For a nation like Eritrea, which prioritizes internal development, how does this complex system create a "chilling effect" on foreign investment and banking? Furthermore, what are the hidden humanitarian costs when third-party vendors refuse to engage with the country out of fear of secondary sanctions?

In my work, I prefer not to use the term "chilling effect" because it's been popularized and carries a political connotation. I usually prefer the word "over-compliance." Formally, one of the biggest problems today is that we face a multiplicity of unilateral sanctions regimes. They are usually not imposed by a single country, but by

multiple countries, and the scope of the sanctions varies. The scope might change very quickly, and you can never be sure that entities that are not under sanctions today will not be under sanctions tomorrow.

Additionally, there are several significant challenges in enforcing unilateral sanctions. These include being designated under secondary sanctions, which refers not only to entities and individuals in the country already under sanctions but also to any third-country individuals and companies from the countries that impose sanctions. Additionally, those accused under unilateral sanctions might face criminal charges. In 2024, the EU adopted a regulation on the criminalization of sanctions and qualified it as a serious crime, requesting member states to criminalize it, starting from five years' imprisonment. In the United States, for example, allegations of conventional sanctions might end up in 20 years' imprisonment. Besides that, many companies and individuals face challenges

and how does it make the impact of these measures even harder on ordinary civilians? Could you share some examples you have seen in other contexts?

Over-compliance is a sort of an approximate word which is not liked by many people, because many imply that we shouldn't talk about compliance since coercive measures are illegal. But over-compliance occurs when the private sector or other entities begin to act beyond what has already been imposed under unilateral coercive measures. Sometimes, it happens because sanctions can be interpreted narrowly or broadly. And sometimes it comes from fear. A company decides not to get involved because it's not sure whether the sector will be targeted in the future.

In practice, the impact of over-compliance is very broad. For example, food and medicine are formally exempt from unilateral sanctions, and there are usually guidelines for humanitarian assistance or general licenses to

their position internationally?

When I was appointed as a mandate holder, no assessment of the humanitarian impact of unilateral coercive measures was conducted. The discussion at different platforms consisted of the sanctioning states saying there is no humanitarian impact of UCM, and the sanctioned countries saying there is. It was perceived as something being highly politicized without any evidence to be discussed. That's why one of the approaches to the function of the mandate which I decided upon was that, in order to discuss and build up a dialogue, we need to be able to know exactly what we are talking about. That's why I started to work on identifying whether specific impacts are results of UCM or not.

As an example, when we are talking about growing maternal mortality rates, it can be the result of different reasons: the state not contributing to building hospitals, the general impossibility of getting to a hospital due to transportation or fuel issues due to sanctions, or the lack of medicines that couldn't be delivered due to sanctions. That's how I started to monitor cases and try to identify what the reasons were. When we start discussing specific cases, you cannot deny the facts. If it is possible to demonstrate that people are dying because there is no medicine—especially when the government always provided this medicine free of charge or heavily subsidized, and is ready to continue doing so, as I have reflected in my report on the impact of sanctions on the right to health—then we can talk about the direct impact on the right to health. The same goes for other aspects as well.

From my perspective, as soon as we start talking about real cases, those imposing sanctions are much more inclined to discuss specific situations. That's why I'm encouraging all states to do monitoring. I developed a monitoring system that is placed on the front page of the mandate website, which is open for everyone to fill with a personal story, and is very simple and user-friendly.

What has been your experience in Eritrea so far? What have you heard, and what are your reflections on the visit?

Well, as I have already said, it is very complicated for me to judge, as long as I haven't done a country visit. That's why I cannot make an observation, although what has been heard around is the complications and terrible impact of over-compliance, when the measures taken go much beyond what is prescribed by

UCM, affecting all people from the perspective of investment and banking and many other areas.

Finally, based on lessons from other countries, what practical advice would you offer Eritrea, a country experiencing the impacts of UCM?

The recommendations which I am making are very common for any country under sanctions, and, to be honest, too many countries which aren't under sanctions but whose individuals and companies might be affected by secondary sanctions or other means of pressure. Since the last couple of years, I have also been sending the same recommendations to the countries which impose sanctions because their nationals become affected too.

First, I am calling for monitoring and assessing the humanitarian impact of UCM enforcement and over-compliance. If we do not know the facts, it is very hard to negotiate. The second point is to raise the issue of the negative impact of UCM at different international forums—not only within my mandate but also within the Universal Periodic Review, UN treaty body reports, and reports on the achievements of the Sustainable Development Goals. To do it, we need facts, statistics, and causal links. Just saying UCM are affecting human rights doesn't provide any ground for discussion.

Additionally, I'm encouraging states to raise this issue with UN specialized agencies because many of them have a mandate relevant to human rights—for example, the Food and Agriculture Organization, which is working hard to achieve food sustainability; the World Health Organization, which is involved in healthcare; or UNESCO and UNICEF, as far as we are talking about education development and more. I believe that as soon as these discussions start to be held not only at the level of one mandate but on different platforms, it will be easier to do the monitoring and easier to discuss. And I hope it will pave a good way to reduce and lift unilateral coercive measures.

Another recommendation that I make is to start doing careful research in this field. As an international law professor, I conclude that it's not possible to say that all UCMs are violating all human rights or all international treaties. It is very important to conduct a careful analysis of every measure taken unilaterally by states.

Thank you, Professor Alena.



ranging from reputational risks to the possibility of fines that could be as high as nearly nine billion dollars.

Sanctions are formulated in such a way that they might be interpreted narrowly or extremely broadly. And often, sanctions against a single company or individual might be interpreted as affecting the whole sector of the economy, or, when imposed on high state officials like the president or ministers, as affecting the whole country or specific sectors. Taking into account this very high level of penalties and the huge complications in getting delisted, many companies decide on over-compliance and choose not to engage in any relations which might have anything to do with countries under sanctions. It ultimately blocks cooperation in the financial and investment areas, as well as in the educational and professional areas.

You often speak about over-compliance. What does this mean,

deliver them. At the same time, I have seen cases where the monopolistic producer of special types of medicine—like bandages for burn-treated children, specific types of insulin for diabetes, or medicine for autism—cannot deliver because the monopolist producer is scared to get payment from the country under sanctions or doesn't want to sell because of possible reputational risk. In that case, the producer, although formally not violating unilateral sanctions regimes, prefers not to deal with a country under sanctions rather than risk losing other, larger partners. As a result, although the medicine is under a humanitarian exception, it's not delivered.

Your mandate has developed tools to monitor and assess the impact of UCM. Why is having solid evidence and data so important? Taking into account what you have seen globally, how does building national capacity to document and monitor these impacts help countries respond more effectively and strengthen

LETTER to the EDITOR

The Sudanese–Eritrean Relations: A Firm Partnership Beyond Geography, Rooted in a Shared Destiny

By: Ambassador Osman Ahmed Abdul Bari, Ambassador of the Republic of the Sudan to Eritrea

The Relations between the Republic of the Sudan and the State of Eritrea represent an advanced model of bilateral relations in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea regions. Their roots run deep in history, and their dimensions intersect politically, securely, economically, and socially, making them strategic relations based on mutual trust, good neighborliness, and a set of intertwined interests and a shared destiny.

The geographical borders between Sudan and Eritrea have never constituted a real barrier between the two peoples; rather, they have served as a bridge for human connection and cultural and social interaction. The Sudan played an important historical role in supporting the

of the border have further deepened this relationship, making it a bond between two peoples before it is a relationship between two states.

Political coordination based on mutual respect

Politically, the relations between Khartoum and Asmara are characterized by a high level of understanding and coordination, particularly on regional issues of shared interest. Eritrea has consistently maintained a firm position rooted in respect for Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and in rejecting any external interference in its internal affairs. In return, the Sudan views Eritrea as a reliable partner in promoting regional stability, especially amid the complex security and political challenges facing the Horn of Africa.

Eritrea—both its leadership and



stability, territorial integrity, and the preservation of its sovereign gains.

A security partnership in a turbulent regional environment

On the security front, Sudanese–Eritrean cooperation constitutes a key pillar of stability along their shared border, which extends for hundreds of kilometers. Security coordination and information exchange have contributed to curbing illicit activities, combating smuggling and illegal migration, and preventing armed groups and militias operating outside the law from exploiting the border areas. The importance of this cooperation is magnified amid ongoing regional instability, as both countries recognize that the security of one is inseparable from the security of the other.

Promising economic horizon

Economically, the relations between the Sudan and Eritrea hold significant opportunities that have

yet to be fully utilized. Sudan's vast agricultural and livestock and minerals potential, combined with Eritrea's strategic location on the Red Sea, its vital ports, and its economic resources, together form a solid foundation for genuine economic integration. Intra-trade, transport, and joint investment open wide horizons for enhancing developments in ways that serve the interests of both peoples and support economic stability in the region.

The humanitarian dimension of Sudanese–Eritrean relations has been clearly evident during times of crisis faced by both countries. Over decades, the Sudan hosted large numbers of Eritreans during the struggle for independence, while Eritrea, in turn, demonstrated supportive and compassionate positions toward the Sudanese people in their various hardships, driven by a firm belief in a shared destiny.

Following the war imposed on the Sudan, Eritrea opened its doors to Sudanese citizens. President Isaias Afwerki directed that their entry and residence in Eritrea be facilitated using whatever identification documents were available, without any complications. This noble humanitarian stance reflects the depth of fraternal ties between the two brotherly and friendly peoples.

Toward a sustainable strategic partnership

With its historical legacy, political trust, and security and economic complementarity, Sudanese–Eritrean relations are well-positioned to move from traditional cooperation to a comprehensive strategic partnership. Achieving this requires strengthening institutional

dialogue, expanding areas of cooperation, and building on the strong political will demonstrated by the leadership of both countries. In light of current regional and international challenges, the relationship between the Sudan and Eritrea remains a living example of how excellent neighborliness and mutual respect can create genuine stability—one that extends beyond the two countries to encompass the entire Horn of Africa.

The Sudanese – Eritrean relations, in their historical context and contemporary dynamics, have transcended the framework of conventional bilateral ties to become a geopolitical partnership with structural dimensions. This partnership has been shaped by geopolitical considerations and transformations in regional security in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.

The convergence of visions regarding national sovereignty, rejection of external tutelage, and confronting indirect forms of interference has contributed to consolidating this relationship as one of the pillars of regional balance. This partnership also extends to a comprehensive approach to economic development through the integrated utilization of Sudan's resources and Eritrea's maritime position, thereby strengthening economic independence.

The Sudanese –Eritrean partnership represents a strategic cornerstone for reshaping the equations of stability in the region and a model of cooperation that seeks to manage crisis from within the region itself, transforming them into a strategic asset that serves regional stability and the interests of its peoples.



struggle of the Eritrean people for independence, leaving a profound and lasting impact on the Eritrean national consciousness—an impact that continues to be reflected in the positions of the Eritrean leadership and popular sentiment toward Sudan to this day. Moreover, the extended social and tribal ties across both sides

its people—has taken a historic and steadfast stance in support of Sudan during its current war, the War of Dignity. This position represents an advanced and distinctive model of solidarity, embodied in the direct leadership of His Excellency President Isaias Afwerki and his clear support for Sudan's unity,





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Formal Education, Certifications or Equivalents	- Mechanical or electrical trade qualification - Planning or CMMS training (desirable)
Working Experience – Nature & Length	4+ years maintenance experience 1-2+ years planning experience fixed plant.
Technical Skills	- Strong SAP/CMMS skills - Knowledge of maintenance strategies for HME assets - Ability to read drawings and manuals
Behavioral Skills	- Good communication - Excellent attention to details - Strong communication and coordination - Ability to manage priorities an deadlines

General Information and other requirements:

- Place of Work: AMSC Sites
- Type of contract: Indefinite Period
- Salary: As per the Company salary scale

Additional requirements for Nationals:

- Having fulfilled his/her National Service obligation and provide evidence of release paper from the Ministry of Defense.
- Present clearance paper from current/last employer.
- Testimonial documents to be attached (CV, work experience credentials, a copy of your National Identity Card, etc.).
- Only shortlisted applicants would be considered as potential candidates for an interview.
- Application documents will not be returned to the sender.
- All applications should be sent through the post office.
- Deadline for application: 7 days from the day of publication in the Newspaper.

Address: Please mail your applications to:

Asmara Mining Share Company,
P. O. Box 10688 Asmara, Eritrea

- Applicants shall be required to send a copy to:
Mineral Resources Management
P.O. Box – 272
Asmara

Note to Eritrean applicants:

Please send a copy of your application to
Aliens Employment Permit Affairs,
P. O. Box 7940 Asmara, Eritrea

ERITREA
(Invitation for Bids [IFB])

IFB Number: 06.2/01/ OCBN/AfDB-DRSLP V/AED/YT/26

Purchaser: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE

Project: DROUGHT RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOOD

PROGRAM (DRSLP V) - ERITREA

PROGRAM

Contract title: SUPPLY OF Vitamines, minerals and antibiotics

Country: ERITREA

Grant No.: 5900155016104/2100155040575

Procurement Method: OPEN COMPETITIVE BIDDING (NATIONAL)

OCBI / LCB No: 06.2/01/ OCBN/AfDB-DRSLP V/AED/YT/26

Issued on: January 2026

- The Ministry of Agriculture of the State of Eritrea has received financing from the African Development Bank Group hereinafter called the Bank toward the cost of DROUGHT RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOOD PROGRAM (DRSLP V) - ERITREA and intends to apply part of the proceeds toward payments under the contract for the Supply of **Vitamines, minerales and antibiotics**.
- The Ministry of Agriculture of the State of Eritrea now invites sealed Bids from eligible Bidders for the Supply of **Vitamines, minerals and antibiotics**.
- Bidding will be conducted through the Open Competitive Bidding (National), (OCBN) method as specified in the Bank’s [Procurement Framework](#) dated October, 2015 and is open to all eligible bidders as defined in the Procurement Framework.
- Interested eligible Bidders may obtain further information from Ministry of Agriculture of the State of Eritrea, Yacob Tesfom, yacobtesfom@gmail.com and inspect the bidding document during office hours i.e., 08:00 to 15:00 hours at the address given below.
- The bidding document in English may be received by interested eligible Bidders upon the submission of a written application to the address below.
- Bids must be delivered to the address below on or before **10:30 a.m.** local time on **03 Mar 2026**. Electronic Bidding **will not** be permitted. Late Bids will be rejected. Bids will be publicly opened in the presence of the Bidders’ designated representatives and anyone who chooses to attend at the address below on **11:00 a.m.** local time on **03 Mar 2026**.
- All Bids must be accompanied by a Bid Security of **USD 300.00 or its equivalent in convertible currency**
- The address (es) referred to above is (are): Ministry of Agriculture of the State of Eritrea
Yacob Tesfom
Head Office, Gejeret, Sawa Street,
P.O. Box 1048,
Tel. 002911189266/002911180699,
Asmara, Eritrea
Email: yacobtesfom@gmail.com.



ASMARA MINING SHARE COMPANY
Abo Street, No. 178, House No. 16
Gejeret, P.O. Box 10688

Tel. ++291-1-153986
Asmara, Eritrea

VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT

Asmara Mining Share Company is inviting applicants for the following position.

Isolation Officer
Number required – (04)
Type of contract – Indefinite

Major Duties and responsibilities

- Supports the Senior Electrician in maintaining a safe and reliable fixed plant environment by leading and executing the isolation and lockout of electrical, pneumatic, gravitational, and mechanical energy sources. This role also assists with electrical tasks, including installation, troubleshooting, and maintenance of equipment to ensure optimal performance and safety.
- Reports directly to the Senior Electrician and actively contributes to daily plant maintenance, operational support, team development, and continuous improvement initiatives—ensuring all activities align with and support the achievement of production, safety, and maintenance KPIs.
-

TASK DESCRIPTION EXPANDED TO CORE PERFORMANCE AREA

- Interpret electrical schematics, control narratives, and piping & instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) to accurately identify equipment and perform effective isolation and lockout procedures.
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- Conduct audits on all equipment to identify issues within lockout systems, perform necessary repairs, and escalate unresolved problems for further action.
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- Perform preventive and corrective maintenance on electrical systems and equipment, including MV/LV motors, VFDs, MCCs, transformers, switchgear, lighting systems, UPS units, and backup generators.
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- Respond promptly and professionally to emergency breakdowns and after-hours maintenance calls, ensuring rapid restoration of equipment.
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- Understand plant interlocks and automatic start-up sequences to ensure complete isolation of upstream and downstream equipment.
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- Perform equipment isolation in full compliance with site isolation and lockout procedures, ensuring strict adherence to all safety standards.
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- Collaborate with other departments (e.g., mechanical, instrumentation, operations) to coordinate cross-functional maintenance efforts.
-
- Maintain accurate records
-
- of isolation activities and ensure proper documentation for compliance and reporting.
-
- Manage the issuance of lockout keys and tags, conduct regular audits, and maintain an up-to-date register of all keys issued on site.
- Promote safe work practices and adherence to isolation standards

- within the team.
- Assist in electrical work, including installation, troubleshooting, and maintenance of equipment to ensure safe and reliable operations.
 - Ensure proper use of PPE and compliance with all site safety procedures, hazard identification, and risk mitigation measures.

Profile: Qualifications and Experience

Formal Education, Certifications or Equivalents	• Grade 12 • Technical College Electrical Engineering Diploma/certificate
Working Experience – Nature & Length	• 5 years’ experience as an Electrician • Familiarity with relevant health and safety standards and regulations. • In-depth knowledge of different Electrical Fixed Plant Equipment, i.e. Crusher, Mills, Conveyor belt, Pumps etc. • Comply with all HS&E policies, procedures and instructions.
Technical Skills	• Experience in Slurry Pumps, Crusher, Mills, Conveyor belt and Floatation Cells • Analytical skills & Decision-making skills • Basic knowledge of CMMS systems & Proficient Microsoft skills • Valid Driver’s License
Behavioral Skills	• Good Interpersonal skills • Demonstrated team building and mentoring skills • Strong interpersonal relationship-building skills and adaptability to work with people of different cultures.

General Information and other requirements:

- Place of Work: AMSC Sites
- Type of contract: Indefinite Period
- Salary: As per the Company salary scale

Additional requirements for Nationals:

- Having fulfilled his/her National Service obligation and provide evidence of release paper from the Ministry of Defense.
- Present clearance paper from current/last employer.
- Testimonial documents to be attached (CV, work experience credentials, a copy of your National Identity Card, etc.).
- Only shortlisted applicants would be considered as potential candidates for an interview.
- Application documents will not be returned to the sender.
- All applications should be sent through the post office.
- Deadline for application: 7 days from the day of publication in the Newspaper.

- Address: Please mail your applications to:
Asmara Mining Share Company,
P. O. Box 10688 Asmara, Eritrea
- Applicants shall be required to send a copy to:
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P.O. Box – 272
Asmara
- Note to Eritrean applicants:
Please send a copy of your application to
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P. O. Box 7940 Asmara, Eritrea



Professor Alena Douhan on the Negative Impacts of Unilateral Coercive Measures

Sabrina Solomon

Could you briefly tell us who you are and what your role as a UN Special Rapporteur involves? Could you also share the difference between your role and the UN team?

I am an independent expert appointed by the UN Council to analyze the humanitarian impact of unilateral sanctions and the means of their enforcement worldwide. I'm not UN staff focused on a specific country; rather, I analyze the factual and legal grounds to determine what constitutes unilateral coercive measures and what steps states can take to mitigate the negative impact of such measures in any country worldwide. Therefore, I continue to work as a university professor back home. Still, I'm also entitled to engage in a wide range of activities within the Human Rights Council, including country visits. So far, I have done seven country visits, including to China, Cuba, Qatar, Zimbabwe, Iran, Venezuela, and Syria. I'm also entitled to organize events, such as conferences, and to draft documents—for example, if I believe that a state's legislative activity might violate human rights through unilateral coercive measures and probable over-compliance.

You are in Eritrea at the government's invitation for a technical visit, not a formal country visit. Could you explain the difference between the two and the purpose of a technical visit?

In accordance with the mandate, a Special Rapporteur is entitled to conduct various types of visits. The most traditional one is a country visit, of which I have done seven. The purpose of country visits is usually to come to a country and talk to both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders to understand, from the perspective of my mandate, how different categories of human rights—from the right to health up to the right to development—might be affected by the enforcement of unilateral coercive measures or over-compliance with such measures by different actors. In that case, I usually meet around eighty stakeholders within a two-week country visit and, as a result, prepare a report. Such a report is presented at a session of the Human Rights Council. Country visits are based on the principles of impartiality, independence, and verification; therefore, the meetings are roughly equally balanced between governmental and non-governmental stakeholders.

Professor Alena Douhan is the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights. She is a professor of international law and a recognized expert on sanctions, human rights, and international legal frameworks. Appointed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2020, Professor Douhan has conducted country visits to several nations, including Iran, Cuba, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe; produced thematic reports; and developed tools to assess how unilateral coercive measures affect the humanitarian sector and ordinary people.

At Eritrea's invitation, Professor Douhan recently undertook a technical capacity-building visit. During her stay, she met with a number of high-level government officials and conducted a technical capacity-building workshop with line ministries. Upon concluding her visit, she sat down for an interview with Eri-TV's Raffaele Giuseppe and Eritrea Profile's Sabrina Solomon. Excerpts from that conversation follow.

Another type of visit I am currently doing is a technical or academic capacity-building visit. This is a type of visit where I come to do more than ask questions. My task here is to explain to different stakeholders how the special procedures work, the activities of my mandate, and the functioning of the human rights system in general. At the end of a technical visit, no report is expected, provided I haven't conducted an assessment of the impact of unilateral coercive measures on human rights in Eritrea.

Many people hear the word "sanctions" without fully understanding it. How are unilateral coercive measures different from sanctions agreed by the UN Security Council, and why does that difference matter in practice?

That is a very interesting question because, in reality, no one around the world can give you the exact definition of the word "sanctions," as the term has not been settled in any international treaty. That's why, traditionally, the term "sanctions" is used for nearly any means of domestic pressure. I can only explain from an international law perspective.

Under the UN Charter, the Security Council has unique competence to decide on the use of enforcement measures when acting under Chapter VII in the case of a breach of the peace or an act of aggression.

At the same time, we need to recognize that states usually try to

influence each other's behavior, and certain forms of pressure are permissible under international law. In particular, states are entitled to take unfriendly but legal measures—measures that do not violate any single international obligation binding on states. These measures are so-called retorsions. As an example of retorsion, a state might decide to withdraw from an international treaty with State B, but it cannot do so immediately; it must follow the procedures outlined in the treaty. In traditional international law, a state must give twelve months' advance notice to withdraw from a treaty, but must remain bound by the treaty until the moment of withdrawal. Or a state might, for example, decide to end diplomatic relations with another unfriendly state, though that is legal.

Another type of unilateral pressure permissible under international law is the application of so-called countermeasures. This is when a state breaches international law in response to a prior breach by another state. Still, such measures can be taken only by a state or group of states when the violation reaches a certain threshold, as in cases of genocide. And it shall be directed at the perpetrator state; it must be clear what has been violated. Such measures shall encourage states to start fulfilling international obligations and shall in no way violate fundamental human rights. So any measures which are unfriendly but legal, or those taken as countermeasures, do not constitute unilateral coercive measures.

However, means of pressure taken without the authorization of the UN Security Council, which do not conform to any of the above criteria or which violate international treaties or do not fit the criteria of countermeasures, constitute unilateral coercive measures and are illegal under international law, as has been referred to in multiple resolutions of the Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly.

From your mandate's perspective, how do unilateral coercive measures imposed on Eritrea relate to the principles of the UN Charter, particularly sovereignty, non-interference, and international cooperation?

Well, as I haven't visited a country, I cannot comment on the impact of unilateral coercive measures in Eritrea. Still, I would be happy to provide some reflections from reports which have already been published about the use of unilateral coercive measures in general and the relation of these measures to international legal standards.

As I have already mentioned, unilateral coercive measures violate international obligations and do not meet the criteria for countermeasures. From the perspective of the fundamental principles of international law set forth in the Charter of the UN, as well as the Declaration on Principles of International Law, the use of means that can be qualified as unilateral coercive measures violates the principles of sovereign equality of states. No state can judge another state; they are equal. Moreover, these measures constitute a violation of the principles of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states and the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes, because states are obliged to look for ways to cooperate and to settle any disputes which might arise in bilateral relations by peaceful means.

It's also necessary to take into account that when we're talking about unilateral coercive measures, we're not only violating fundamental



principles of international law; they might also affect other international obligations being enforced between states. And here, I'm not only talking about bilateral obligations—violations of treaties, bilateral investment protection agreements, or agreements on mutual assistance in criminal, civil, or other matters—but also about violations of multilateral international treaties in different areas, like civil aviation or the struggle against transnational crimes. Naturally, it's not possible to say that any unilateral means of pressure violates all these international treaties; it requires a very careful assessment. But based on my analysis, I concluded that specific measures violate multilateral and bilateral treaties.

Based on your experience in different countries, how do these measures affect everyday life, such as access to health services, food, banking, education, or humanitarian assistance?

Again, I can only respond to this question regarding other country visits and the thematic reports I have prepared during my work under the mandate. Unfortunately, I have to conclude that the use of unilateral coercive measures, the means of enforcing them, and over-compliance by the private sector and other stakeholders with such measures violate a broad range of human rights. It naturally depends on the scope of measures imposed on a specific country and on that country's sustainability. Many countries are more self-sufficient in food and healthcare, while others are not.

Continued on page 4

